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Patents at the Supreme Court:
It Could've Been Worse
Gregory Dolin*
I. Introduction

Since the formation of the u.s. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in 1984, the Supreme Court has taken a mostly "hands-off"
approach to patent cases. Indeed, in the first 20 years of the Federal
Circuit's existence, the Supreme Court heard only 10 cases dealing
with substantive patent law (and two of these cases dealt with rather
esoteric issues of plant patents). Since 2004, however, the Court
has shown increased interest in engaging with patent law and has
granted at least 16 substantive patent cases on issues as varied as patent-eligible subject matter and the interaction of patent and FDA law.
In taking these cases, the Supreme Court has been widely viewed
as attempting to "rein in" the overly patent-friendly Federal Circuit.
Whether or not this was the Supreme Court's goal or intent, it is undeniable that, on balance, its rulings have been far less solicitous of
patentees than those emanating from the Federal Circuit.
In the last few years in particular, the Court has expanded the zone
of exclusion from patent eligibility, 1 limited the availability of injunctive relief for patentees whose patents have been adjudged to be valid
and infringed,2 and broadened the scope of the patent exhaustion
doctrine.3 To be sure, not all of the Supreme Court's decisions were
"anti-patent." For example, the Court chose to adhere to the rule that
* Associate Professor of Law, Co-Director, Center for Medicine & Law, University of
Baltimore School of Law; Adjunct Associate Professor of Emergency Medicine, Johns
Hopkins University School of Medicine. Many thanks to Irina Manta, Tara Helfman,
and Adam Mossoff for their help in drafting this article.
lMayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
2 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.s. 388 (2006).
3 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.s. 617 (2008).
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anyone seeking to challenge an issued patent's validity may do so
only by the standard of" clear and convincing evidence," rather than
by the lower "preponderance of the evidence" standard, as many
law professors have been urging it to do. 4 Nonetheless, the overall
trajectory of the Court's patent jurisprudence has been toward a narrower set of patent rights. Thus, there was significant trepidation in
the patent bar and the academy when the Supreme Court decided to
hear three patent cases this term: Bowman v. Monsanto,S Association for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,6 and FTC v. Actavis.7 Each of
the cases had the potential to rewrite decades of patent law and significantly upend major industries that have come to rely on patents.
Ultimately, however, the Court adopted an incremental approach to
each of the problems it addressed. And though the overall outcome
in this term's patent cases leaves quite a lot to be desired, the worst
fears of the patent-dependent industries did not come to pass.
II. Bowman v. Monsanto
Bowman turned out to be perhaps the least controversial of the intellectual property cases before the Court-though the case certainly
elicited much attention because Monsanto Company was the other
party to a dispute that involved genetically modified organisms
(CMOs). Yet it is precisely because the issue seemed so clear-cut that
the decision to hear Bowman raised significant worries about the direction that the Supreme Court might take.
At issue in the case was a type of soybean produced by Monsanto.
By modifying the soybean's genetic makeup, the company was able
to create and patent a bean that is resistant to certain pesticides-specifically to Monsanto's own Roundup. In other words, a farmer planting these particular soybeans (known as Roundup Ready) can spray
his field with Roundup pesticide confident that the chemical will kill
unwanted weeds but will leave the soybean cash crop unaffected. It
should come as no surprise that Monsanto charges a premium for the

4

Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
v. Monsanto Co., 133 s. Ct. 1761 (2013).

5 Bowman

Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 s. Ct. 2107 (2013).
v. Actavis, Inc., 133 s. Ct. 2223 (2013). This article will not discuss Actavis beyond
noting that in that case, as in the other two, the Court, though taking an anti-patent
step, made sure that that step was rather modest.
6

7 FTC
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advantage that the pesticide-resistant seed provides. A seed bought
from Monsanto is thus significantly more expensive than a seed
bought from a grain elevator.
When the farmer buys a Roundup Ready seed, he ends up growing more identical seeds, owing to the genetic features of the initial
seed. That is, a farmer who planted one seed will, at the end of the
season, end up with several dozen identical seeds borne by the plant
that sprouted from the original. Absent unexpected (and unlikely)
genetic mutations, these new seeds have the same features as the
original seed-they too are Roundup-proof. Theoretically, then, a
farmer wishing to grow Roundup Ready soybeans only needs to buy
seeds from Monsanto once with every subsequent generation being
regrown from that original purchase.
Monsanto recognized this problem and sought to address it
through contractual arrangements. When selling its patented soybeans either to farmers directly or to authorized dealers, the company secures a contractual promise from buyers that they will use
the purchased seeds to grow only a single generation of soybean
plants and won't use the resultant seeds to plant a second generation of plants. Vernon Bowman, a commercial farmer, purchased
Roundup Ready seeds from Monsanto's authorized dealer and
signed the appropriate contract. He honored the terms of the contract with respect to the seeds that he purchased from Monsanto
and its dealers. The seeds that Bowman grew from this original
purchase were all harvested and sold to a grain elevator, with none
kept for additional replanting. Bowman, however, found what he
thought was an ingenious way of circumventing Monsanto's contractual restrictions. After selling his own harvest of soybeans, he
purchased more soybeans, but this time not from Monsanto or any
of its dealers but from a grain elevator. Though the grain elevator
had a mixture of beans, it was fairly easy for Bowman to separate
the progeny of the original Monsanto seeds from that of unmodified seeds. All Bowman had to do was to plant the seeds bought
from the grain elevator and then spray them with Roundup. The
second-generation Roundup Ready seeds would survive, whereas
the second-generation unmodified seeds would not. Bowman
would then be able to harvest the surviving seeds and sell the bulk
of them while keeping a sufficient amount for planting the following year, when he would be able to repeat the process.
269
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This subterfuge allowed Bowman to avoid paying Monsanto's
high premium for its patented soybean and instead to pay the regular commodity price for soybeans. The grain elevator, meanwhile,
couldn't charge the premium for the patented soybean as opposed to
the unmodified natural one because it's not in the business of selling
soybeans for future agricultural use. Indeed, federal law explicitly
prohibits grain elevators from packaging or marketing their wares as
agricultural products. 8 Thus, from the perspective of a grain elevator, a modified soybean is identical to an unmodified soybean, and
is worth exactly the same. For that reason, all soybeans are stored
together and the same commodity price is charged for all of themregardless of whether they're descendants of the originally patented
seed. Accordingly, the grain elevator (unlike Monsanto or any of its
authorized dealers) could not and would not insist on a contractual
promise that purchased seeds not be used for multiple generations
of agricultural use.
Eventually, Monsanto discovered Bowman's operation and filed
suit alleging that his activities infringed Monsanto's patents, which
claimed (in one form or another) a modified gene that encoded for
the herbicide resistance. 9 Monsanto argued that by growing new
seeds that contain the patented gene, Bowman was infringing Monsanto's exclusive rights to "make[], use[], offer[] to sell, or sell[]" the
patented invention. 10 Given that he was in fact producing seeds containing the patented gene, Bowman was forced to concede that he indeed "makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells" the patented product. The
statute, however, makes an infringer only out of an individual who
"makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells" the patented invention without
authority.l1 Bowman argued that his production of new seeds was
authorized by the doctrine of patent exhaustion-which holds that
once the patentee has made an authorized sale of a patented invention, the purchaser can use the sold product or resell it to others as
he sees fit and on whatever terms he sees fit. Bowman argued that
the doctrine prevents Monsanto from objecting to downstream uses
7 U.s.c. § 1571; Ind. Code § 15-15-1-32 (2012); Bowman, supra note 5, at 1765.
U.s. Patent Nos. 5,352,605 (filed Oct. 28, 1993) and RE39,247 E (filed Aug. 22, 2006);
Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (describing the patented
technology).
10 35 U.s.c. § 271(a).
11 ld.
8 See
9
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of its patented seed because Monsanto exhausted its patent rights
via the original sale of the modified soybean. He also argued that
whatever contractual restrictions Monsanto tried to place on the use
of the seed post-sale were void because they were inconsistent with
the nature of the transaction between Monsanto and the dealers or
farmers, thus constituting an "end run" around the patent exhaustion doctrine.
Bowman lost the infringement suit and the subsequent appeal to
the Federal Circuit.12 The Supreme Court granted Bowman's petition
for the writ of certiorari to address whether the Federal Circuit erred
when it created "an exception to the doctrine of patent exhaustion
for self-replicating technologies."13 Given the unanimity of the Federal Circuit panel-which included a judge generally regarded as a
skeptic of broad patent law claims-the cert grant was somewhat of
a surprise. As the old adage goes, the Supreme Court doesn't grant
cases to affirm, and that has been especially true as of late with cases
emanating from the Federal Circuit.
The question was whether the Supreme Court would take a
broader view of patent exhaustion than did the lower courts, thus
potentially undermining the very business model of companies making GMOs. Had the Court adopted Bowman's argument, it would
necessarily follow that companies like Monsanto would be able to
enjoy their exclusive rights to make and sell their technology for only
a year or two (rather than the statutory 20 years of the patent term)
because after the first year of sales, downstream purchasers would be
able to reproduce the patented GMOs and sell them in competition
with the patentee. Each subsequent year would potentially bring in
more and more competitors until the price for the patented GMO
soybean would be equivalent to the cost of raising any soybean. In
other words, the patent holder would be unable to charge a premium
and so would reap a much lower profit than it can now, perhaps to
the point of not even being able to recoup the initial investment in
creating the seed. The Supreme Court then was in a perfect position
to do considerable damage to an industry that is dependent on patent protection for its business model.

Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834 (S.D. Ind. 2009), af£' d, 657 F.3d 134l.
v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 420 (2012).

12 Monsanto
13 Bowman
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What made the grant all the more suspicious was the attack on a
1992 Federal Circuit case, Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc,14 Bowman's cert petition expressly asked the Court to overrule Mallinckrodt. The United States, appearing as amicus curiae, though ostensibly supporting affirmance of the decision below, endorsed Bowman's
argument on this point. The Mallinckrodt case is interesting because
it stands for the proposition that the patentee can avoid triggering
the patent exhaustion rights if it contractually restricts the post-sale
use of the patented device. In Mallinckrodt, the Federal Circuit held
that when the patentee sold certain medical devices imprinted with
"single-use only" notice, disregarding such notice and reusing the
devices constituted patent infringement. The Mallinckrodt decision
has come under much criticism over the last 20 years, so the Supreme
Court's decision to review Bowman's lawsuit was viewed as a signal
that perhaps the Court not only would broaden the scope of patent
exhaustion doctrine, but also would limit the licensing arrangements
that have grown common between purveyors and users of various
patented goods.
Ultimately, however, the Court dashed those fears-or hopes,
depending on which side of the issue you happen to be on-by issuing a short and almost playful unanimous opinion that explicitly
declined to address the particular problems posed by self-replicating
technologies. ls The ruling was altogether silent on the permissible
scope of licensing arrangements that are meant to counterbalance
the patent exhaustion doctrine. Instead, the Court merely reaffirmed
the uncontroversial proposition that the patent exhaustion doctrine
"restricts a patentee's rights only as to the 'particular article' sold,
it leaves untouched the patentee's ability to prevent a buyer from
making new copies of the patented item."16 This proposition was so
uncontroversial that Bowman readily conceded it in his brief and
at oral argument. This concession proved fatal to Bowman's caseY
Simply put, the Court concluded that by growing successive generations of Roundup Ready soybean seeds, Bowman was making new,
additional patented soybeans-an activity beyond the scope of the
14 Mallinckrodt,

Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
supra note 5, at 1769.
16 ld. at 1766.
17 ld.

15 Bowman,
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patent exhaustion doctrine. And though the Court agreed that seeds
are generally meant to be planted and thus Monsanto would likely
be unable to restrict the planting (or other use) of the very seeds purchased from itself or an authorized dealer had it attempted to do so,
the replanting of new seeds and growing additional generations of
the patented product were outside the safe harbor provisions of the
exhaustion doctrine.
The Court unquestionably got the answer right. As Justice Elena
Kagan recognized in her unanimous opinion, under a contrary holding:
Monsanto's patent would provide scant benefit. After
inventing the Roundup Ready trait, Monsanto would, to be
sure, "receiv[e] [its] reward" for the first seeds it sells. But
in short order, other seed companies could reproduce the
product and market it to growers, thus depriving Monsanto
of its monopoly. And farmers themselves need only buy
the seed once, whether from Monsanto, a competitor, or (as
here) a grain elevator. The grower could multiply his initial
purchase, and then multiply that new creation, ad infinitumeach time profiting from the patented seed without
compensating its inventor.18

The trouble, though, is that the question the Court answered was
not of particular importance to anyone. Both Bowman and Monsanto agreed "that the exhaustion doctrine does not extend to the
right to 'make' a new product."19 The answer to that question in no
way depends on various contractual arrangements that Monsanto
and its dealers entered into with farmers like Bowman. Bowman
would have been adjudged an infringer even absent the restrictive
covenants in the sale, because what he violated was not a contractual
clause-after all, he bought his seeds from a grain elevator and not
from Monsanto-but Monsanto's exclusive right to make new, additional copies of the patented product.
Two far more interesting questions remained unanswered after
Bowman. First, can a patentee sidestep the exhaustion doctrine via restrictive contractual covenants attendant to the sale of a patented device? Second, in the case of self-replicating technologies, can a party
whose wares, through no fault of his own, were contaminated by a
18
19

ld. at 1767 (citations omitted).
ld. at 1766 (citations omitted).
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patented product be an "infringer" within the meaning of 35 U.s.c.
§ 271? In other words, had Monsanto's soybeans been blown over
onto Bowman's field and cross-pollinated his plants-causing some
of Bowman's seeds to contain the patented gene--would Bowman
still be liable for infringement? The Court chose not to answer either
of these questions in its opinion, perhaps because this case was a
poor vehicle to address those issues. After all, Bowman was not an
innocent party whose fields were simply contaminated by Monsanto's product. Nor did he plant his seeds in violation of a contractual
obligation with the patent holder. Thus, there was no need to delve
into these matters.
But that does not mean that these issues simply disappear. Instead,
they have been deferred. When they come up-and they will-the
Court will need to consider seriously how to reconcile the strict liability nature of infringement with the unavoidable infringement resulting from actions of the patentee (and forces of nature) alone. It's quite
possible that the doctrine of patent exhaustion at issue in Bowman
isn't the best tool to resolve this problem, and therefore this question
was best left unaddressed in the present case. However, companies
like Monsanto may need to develop legal arguments in anticipation
of future cases. Similarly, the patent world is now on notice that the
federal government views Mallinckrodt as incorrectly decided and
should expect that argument to be made in due course to the Supreme Court. Patent-reliant companies should be prepared to adjust
their business models accordingly. For now, though, industries that
rely heavily on patented technology can breathe a little more easily
knowing that the Court didn't expand the doctrine of patent exhaustion to the point at which it would undermine the de facto term of the
patent and therefore the economic incentives to innovate.
III. Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics

Whereas Bowman ultimately broke no new ground by relying exclusively on well-established and agreed-upon precedent and deferring the hard questions for later, Myriad did none of those things, instead plunging head-on into scientific issues that the Court, judging
from oral arguments, clearly did not understand. The result was an
incoherent opinion instead of a clear exposition of patent law. That
said, the ultimate outcome in Myriad is not as bad or as radical as
claimed by the petitioners and by a large segment of legal academia.
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Myriad Genetics is a company located in Salt Lake City. In the late
1980s, scientists worldwide, realizing that certain forms of breast and
ovarian cancer have a genetic component, began searching for genes
that increase the likelihood of developing these maladies. Among the
hundreds of scientists searching for the answer, Myriad was first to
find the location of the gene and first to decode its chemical structure
or, in the words of molecular genetics, its "sequence." Myriad managed to separate the cancer-causing gene from the thousands of other
genes located on the same chromosome and to develop a test capable of
confirming the presence or absence of mutations in that gene. Between
1997 and 2000, Myriad obtained a number of patents on the method
of testing for breast cancer and on the isolated gene itself. Because the
company had these patents, it possessed exclusive rights to conduct
genetic testing for the particular genes known as BRCA1 and BRCA2
(pronounced "brack-uh one" and "brack-uh two"). Myriad did license
a number of laboratories to conduct the same tests, but it was under no
legal obligation to do so and extracted a price for its license. Unsurprisingly, Myriad charged a higher price than it would have been able to if
it had multiple competitors providing the same testing service.
Unhappy with this state of affairs, a collection of doctors, patients,
and medical organizations sued Myriad and sought to declare these
patents invalid. Throughout the litigation, the challengers essentially
argued that genetic materials are not human "inventions," but rather
"products of nature" and thus beyond the scope of patent protection. This argument was accepted wholesale by the district court, but
rejected, in a split decision, by the Federal Circuit, which held that
isolated DNA isn't a product of nature and is therefore eligible for
patent protection.2O In 2012, the Supreme Court vacated that decision
and remanded the case to the Federal Circuit in light of a case it had
just decided, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., which limited the scope of patent-eligible subject matter.21 On remand, the Federal Circuit reissued its original decision with only minor changes. 22
The Supreme Court again granted cert.
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. u.s. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181
(SD.N.Y. 2010), afi'd in part & rev'd in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
21 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
22 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. u.s. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed.
Cir.2012).
20
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To understand the nature of the legal dispute in Myriad, it is necessary to understand the basic science underlying the case. Bear with
me through this section, because grasping it is key to understanding
what's going on here and evaluating the Supreme Court's ruling. 23
A DNA molecule consists of two strands of a repetitive sugarphosphate chain called deoxyribose. Each strand is a long molecule
(called a polymer) composed of four types of subunits molecular
bases known as adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine-(" A,"
"C," "G," and "T," respectively, if you recall your high school biology)-leading to a structure resembling four kinds of beads strung
on a necklace. Each adenine base on one strand is paired with a thymine base on the other, and each cytosine base is paired with a guanine base, generating strands that are complementary, not identical.
The DNA molecule can be visualized as a zipper with each strand
serving as tape and the A, C, T, G base pairs forming the teeth. Unlike a regular zipper, a molecule of DNA is neither straight nor flat.
Instead, in its "native" state-the state it assumes naturally inside a
living organism-the DNA molecule is twisted into a spiral ladder
shape, giving rise to the famous" double helix" model. The chemical
and physical properties of native DNA emerge from this combination
of factors: the entire sequence of base pairs (rather than a particular
isolated fragment); the chemical modification of its nucleotides; the
association with proteins such as "histones"; and the overall packaging into superstructures such as chromosomes. Each of these factors plays a role in defining and controlling native DNA's molecular
weight, chemical charge, three-dimensional structure, responsiveness to particular chemicals and enzymes, availability of electrons
for other chemical reactions, and every other property.
The function of DNA is to provide a set of genetic instructions
for the production of other critical molecules: proteins. Amino acids
are the building blocks of proteins, and DNA codes for amino acids.
This coding operates by grouping nucleotides together in groups of
three. Mathematically, each triad drawn from the set of four nucleotides defines a potentially distinct code, yielding 64 distinct possible
values, or "codons."24 For reasons not wholly understood, genes
23 For a more detailed exposition see Gregory Dolin, Exclusivity Without Patents: The
New Frontier of FDA Regulation for Genetic Materials, 98 Iowa L. R. 1399, 1407-17 (2013).
24Because there are only 20 amino acids, several codons may code for the same amino
acid.
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have noncoding regions (known as "introns") that are interspersed
among coding regions (known as "exons"). Indeed, the majority of
genetic material consists of noncoding regions. Mutations in a codon
sequence-which may occur, for example, by adding or deleting a
nucleotide or by changing one nucleotide into another-often result in coding for an incorrect amino acid, leading to a defective or
completely nonfunctional protein. Thus, when diagnosing genetic
disorders, it is important to compare the subject sequence with both
the normal sequence and all known mutations. Furthermore, though
DNA is composed of two strands, only one strand codes for proteins,
while the other simply binds the coding strand. Which strand is coding and which is merely binding can change from one gene to another, however, and even occasionally within a single gene.
DNA doesn't directly code for proteins. Instead, an intermediary
molecule known as RNA is used. Thus, the process of "decrypting"
the DNA's code begins when the DNA region containing the relevant active gene is "transcribed" into a corresponding RNA molecule. RNA is composed of nucleotides attached to a single strand
of a sugar molecule called ribose (as opposed to the dual strands of
deoxyribose in DNA). In a similar vein, single-stranded RNA transcribes only the coding strand, never the binding strand. RNA and
DNA differ in several other significant ways as well. Unlike the native DNA strand that contains multiple genes, only some of which
are active, an RNA molecule contains only a single active gene. Also
unlike DNA, RNA lacks the bound histones that fold DNA into the
complex chromosomal structures. RNA strands also possess several
chemical modifications that native DNA lacks.
Finally, before protein production can begin, a further preprocessing step, known as "RNA splicing," removes noncoding introns from
the RNA and splices the remaining exons together in an uninterrupted string known as "messenger RNA," or mRNA. That sets the
stage for the "translation" step, where cellular mechanisms read the
mRNA, one codon at a time, to produce the final protein structure.
Myriad's patents claimed two types of DNA structures. First, they
claimed an isolated gene coding for BRCAI and BRCA2. 25 In other
words, the claim covered a gene excised from the chromosome, separated from various associated proteins and neighboring genes, and
25

See, e.g., claim 1 of u.s. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed on May 5, 1998).
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otherwise purified.26 It's important to understand that contrary to
various press accounts, Myriad did not attempt to patent genes that
are carried by individuals as part of their genetic makeup. Instead,
Myriad created and patented a small molecule that, standing alone,
isn't carried by any individual. The second set of claims was directed
to a yet further-refined molecule: Myriad constructed a DNA molecule that was complementary to the sequence of mRNA. In other
words, like mRNA (and unlike the native-state DNA) this molecule
no longer had any noncoding introns. Instead, it had only the coding exon regions. In all other respects, it had features of DNA rather
than RNA. This molecule, because it is complementary to the RNA
molecule, is known as cDNAP
The petitioners in Myriad argued that neither isolated DNA nor
cDNA are patent-eligible because both are products of nature. Under
longstanding patent principles, only inventions created by human
ingenuity are eligible for a patent, while naturally occurring products-for example, gold, trees, and so forth-are not patent-eligible. 28 The petitioners' argument rested on the premise that, isolated
or not, these pieces of DNA ultimately perform the same function as
naturally occurring DNA: they code for proteins. In other words, native DNA, isolated DNA, and cDNA all carry the same information.
In the petitioners' view, DNA's information-carrying capacity rendered all DNA molecules carrying that information patent-ineligible
subject matter.
Myriad, on the other hand, pointed out that these precise molecules (whether isolated DNA or cDNA) never existed in nature
until isolated from larger structures. The company argued, and the
Federal Circuit agreed, that the molecules described in the patents
have vastly different chemical properties-such as molecular weight,
ionic charge, and ability to react with other reagents-than naturally

26Technically, the claim went to a wholly synthetic DNA molecule that merely had the
same nucleotide sequence that an excised piece of a chromosome would have had.
This fact alone should have sufficed to settle the patent-eligibility question. The Court
chose to read the claim more broadly, however, so that it would cover not just synthetic constructs but also genetic material excised from the chromosome. I engage the
Court's reasoning on its own terms.
27See, e.g., claim 2 of u.s. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed on May 5,1998).
28 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.s. 303, 309 (1980).
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occurring molecules. In short, the dispute centered on whether DNA
should be judged on its chemical or biological functions.
The solicitor general, arguing the case as amicus curiae, took a
"split the baby" approach. With respect to native DNA, he argued
that isolated DNA is too similar to what occurs in nature to qualify
for patent protection. With respect to cDNA, however, he argued that
human intervention was of sufficient magnitude to make the resultant product patent-eligible.
The Court's opinion ultimately adopted the solicitor general's position and held isolated DNA to be patent-ineligible but cDNA to
be patent-eligible. Surprisingly, this split decision prompted news
media worldwide to announce that the Court "invalidated gene
patents."29 That isn't what the Court did, although the media's confusion is understandable given the incoherent nature of the opinion.
In concluding that isolated DNA is not patent-eligible subject matter,
the Court, per Justice Clarence Thomas, concluded that
Myriad's claims [are notl saved by the fact that isolating DNA
from the human genome severs chemical bonds and thereby
creates a nonnaturally occurring molecule. Myriad's claims
are simply not expressed in terms of chemical composition,
nor do they rely in any way on the chemical changes that
result from the isolation of a particular section of DNA.
Instead, the claims understandably focus on the genetic
information .... [Ilts claim is concerned primarily with the
information contained in the genetic sequence, not with the
specific chemical composition of a particular molecule. 3o

The Court apparently agreed with the petitioners' argument that
DNA is primarily an information-carrying molecule, not subject to
the same rules as other chemical molecules. But a mere page later, in
a single, cursory paragraph, Justice Thomas wrote that the "creation
of a cDNA sequence from mRNA results in an exons-only molecule
that is not naturally occurring," making "cDNA ... distinct from the
DNA from which it was derived. As a result, cDNA is not a 'product

29 See, e.g., David G. Savage, Supreme Court Rejects Gene Patents, L.A. Times, Jun. 14,
2013, at l.
30 Myriad, supra note 6, at 2118 (emphasis in original).
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of nature' and is patent eligible."31 There is no mention of cDNA's
information-carrying capacity.
The legal analysis leading to the conclusion of patent ineligibility
for isolated DNA is thus irreconcilable with the legal analysis leading
to the conclusion of patent eligibility for cDNA. Whereas the former
looks to the information encoded in the DNA molecule, the latter
looks at its chemical structure. No explanation is given as to why
such different approaches are appropriate.
The concluding section of the opinion makes the matter even more
opaque. There, Justice Thomas states that the methods used by Myriad
to find and isolate BRCAI and BRCA2 genes "were well understood,
widely used, and fairly uniform insofar as any scientist engaged in
the search for a gene would likely have utilized a similar approach."32
But it's unclear why this is legally significant. Methods for creating
cDNA are also "well understood, widely used, and fairly uniform."
But it has long been the law that the method of arriving at an invention isn't relevant to the inquiry of whether the invention is novel or
patent-eligible. The inclusion of this phrase only adds confusion to
the requirements for patent eligibility going forward. Will the courts
below now be required not only to identify the amount of difference
between a lab-created product and naturally occurring substances, but
also to determine whether "enough effort" went into creating these
differences? If so, how much effort will be "enough"? It remains to be
seen how the Federal Circuit and district courts apply this decision to
new facts, but the creation of these problems was entirely unnecessary.
The reason for this confusion is the Court's accepting the erroneous argument that DNA is somehow unique with respect to its information-carrying function and capacity. In fact, there's nothing particularly unique about DNA. It's true that DNA carries information that
the cellular mechanisms then use to make RNA and proteins. But the
same can be said about a number of other molecules. For example,
a number of molecules work by binding to cellular proteins on the
outside of the cell, which results in a chain reaction inside the cell
leading to very particular outcomes. Such molecules could be easily
described as "information-carrying" because they carry instructions
for the cell to act a certain way at a certain time. Other proteins bind
31
32

ld. at 2119.
ld. at 2120.
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to DNA itself in order to activate or deactivate certain genes. This
process too could be described as "information-carrying" because
only as a result of such binding do cellular mechanisms know when
to express a particular gene and when to leave it quiescent.
Much medical research is centered on intervening in these processes to modify the expression of certain deleterious genes or to
enhance the expression of beneficial genes. Laboratory-designed
molecules must have the same "informational" capacity as naturally
occurring molecules to work. Consider laboratory-made insulin.
Most of it is either identical or nearly identical to naturally occurring insulin,33 and for good reason. If the laboratory-designed molecule were different, it wouldn't be insulin at all, and could not treat
diabetes. This similarity to the naturally occurring product is to be
celebrated and rewarded rather than held as the basis for patent ineligibility. If the identity of informational function were to serve as a
bar to patent eligibility, such research will grind to a halt.
The Supreme Court should instead have focused on the fact that
isolated DNA and cDNA are merely research, diagnostic, and treatment tools in much the same way as various dyes that are used to
stain biopsies or centrifuges that are used to separate blood products.
There is little doubt that dyes, centrifuges, pipettes, and the like are
all patent-eligible subject matter. The fact that new tools are biological rather than mechanical should not change the analysis. Yet this
fact was lost on the Supreme Court, the petitioners, the solicitor general, and even, in some respects, on Myriad itself. This misconception
led to the illogical and disjointed opinion.
The Court's opinion, though problematic and at war with itself,
was not a total loss. The Court did reject the more extreme version
of the argument pressed by the petitioners and a number of amici,
which urged the Court to declare all DNA to be patent-ineligible on
the theory that the functionality of the invented product should decide its eligibility for a patent. Had the Court adopted that argument,
it would have created significant problems for the biotechnology industry by essentially declaring that medical innovations that rely on
biologic solutions (rather than traditional chemical pills) are beyond
the reach of the Patent Act. The perverse result of such a decision
See FDA, NovoLog Insulin Aspart Label (2013), available at http://www.
accessdata.fda.gov / drugsatfda_docs/ label! 2005 / 020986s033lbl. pdf.
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would have been to incentivize less desirable forms of medical treatments while disincentivizing the more desirable kind. Luckily, the
Court did not go that far, leaving plenty of room for innovation and
patent protection in biotechnology and biopharmaceuticals.
But the Court's opinion does sow confusion where none was necessary, especially in light of the previous term's extraordinarily broad
anti-patent opinion in Mayo. But given the choice between confusion
remediable in lower courts by careful application of Myriad to new
facts and complete prohibition on patenting the fruits of genetic research, the former is clearly better.
IV. Conclusion

This past term, the Supreme Court faced a number of complicated
patent questions. Given the Court's recent performance on patent
law, the industry had much to be concerned about. The Court seemed
poised to: (1) expand the patent exhaustion doctrine significantly, giving a new and broad shield to infringers; (2) limit the scope of patent eligibility, potentially taking an entire industry outside the ambit
of patent protection; and (3) restrict the ability of patentees to enforce
their patents not only through litigation, but also through settlement.34
At the end of the term, however, each industry could breathe a little easier. Though the Court did manage to make the law a little less
patentee-friendly, and did create confusion where none was necessary,
the outcome was far from the worst-case scenario. That's not to say
that patentees can fully relax because it remains to be seen how lower
courts and eventually the Supreme Court answer the questions left
open and resolve the confusion stemming from this term's decisions.
But at least patentees will live to fight another day-an outcome that
was not a given when these cases were set for argument. In short, for
patentees, the Supreme Court's October Term 2012 can best be characterized by an old Jewish saying: "It could've been worse."
34 See

Actavis, supra note 7. In that case, the Supreme Court did not adopt a bright line,
per se rule that under antitrust laws, patentees cannot enter certain types of settlement
agreements with patent challengers. Instead, the Court settled on a "rule of reason"
analysis that, though more restrictive than the current practice, continues to allow
the patentees to protect their patents through settlement agreements. Nonetheless, the
Court's decision sowed much confusion about how to actually apply this new rule. In
that sense, Actavis's incremental approach is similar to the one taken in Bowman and
Myriad.
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